Thirty-five years after a balance-of-payments crisis forced India's government to abandon decades of inward-looking economic policy and open the country's economy to global trade, investment, and competition, 2026 has brought with it a wave of retrospective commentary attempting to reckon honestly with what the 1991 liberalisation reforms actually delivered — and, just as importantly, what they have still failed to deliver more than three decades on. The resulting picture, as painted by economists, policymakers, and business leaders marking the anniversary, is neither the triumphant success story that liberalisation's most enthusiastic proponents might prefer to tell, nor the wholesale failure that its most persistent critics sometimes suggest, but something considerably more nuanced: a genuine, transformative economic success story that has nonetheless left substantial and, in some respects, deeply consequential unfinished business.
The scale of India's economic transformation since 1991 is, by almost any reasonable measure, difficult to overstate. The India of 1991 was an economy operating under an extensive licensing regime — often derisively termed the License Raj — that required government permission for even routine business decisions like capacity expansion, product diversification, and pricing, an economy largely closed to foreign investment and trade, and one that had, in the years immediately preceding the reforms, come perilously close to defaulting on its international payment obligations, forcing the government to physically airlift gold reserves to secure emergency loans from international lenders. The India of 2026, by contrast, stands as one of the world's largest and fastest-growing major economies, home to a vibrant and globally competitive technology services sector, an increasingly sophisticated manufacturing base attracting investment from multinational corporations seeking alternatives to Chinese manufacturing capacity, and financial markets sophisticated enough to support the kind of dynamic, multi-billion-dollar corporate activity — from IPOs to complex financial services innovation — that would have seemed entirely fantastical to observers of India's pre-liberalisation economy.

Growth statistics alone tell a compelling part of this story. India's economy has expanded many-fold in real terms since 1991, transforming the country from a relatively minor player in global trade and investment flows into an economy whose growth trajectory and consumer market potential feature prominently in the strategic calculations of virtually every major global corporation and investment institution. Per capita income, while still leaving India classified as a developing economy by international standards, has grown substantially, lifting hundreds of millions of Indians out of extreme poverty over the decades since liberalisation began, even as debates continue about the precise pace, distribution, and sustainability of this poverty reduction achievement.
The sectoral transformation of the Indian economy since 1991 offers perhaps the most visible testament to liberalisation's impact. India's information technology and IT-enabled services sector, which barely existed in any globally significant form in 1991, has grown into a globally dominant industry generating hundreds of billions of dollars in export revenue and employing millions of Indians directly, alongside the broader ecosystem of ancillary industries and urban development that has grown up around India's major technology hub cities. This sector's emergence, built substantially on the foundation of liberalisation-era policy changes that opened India's economy to global trade and investment while simultaneously allowing Indian entrepreneurs and companies the freedom to build and scale businesses without the suffocating licensing constraints of the pre-1991 era, stands as arguably the single most consequential economic success story to emerge from India's liberalisation journey.
Financial sector development represents another area where liberalisation's impact has proven genuinely transformative. India's stock markets, banking sector, and broader financial services industry have evolved from a comparatively underdeveloped, heavily regulated system into a considerably more sophisticated, market-driven financial ecosystem capable of supporting complex corporate finance activity, a vibrant venture capital and private equity industry funding the country's growing startup ecosystem, and increasingly, a base of retail investors participating directly in equity markets at a scale that would have been unimaginable in the pre-liberalisation era, when Indian household savings were channeled almost exclusively toward physical assets like gold and real estate, or toward low-yielding, government-directed banking deposits.
Yet alongside this genuine transformation, the anniversary commentary emerging in 2026 has been notably candid about the substantial unfinished business that remains. Weak public services represent perhaps the most frequently cited area of continued concern, with critics pointing to India's continued struggles in areas including public healthcare infrastructure, the quality and accessibility of public education, particularly at the primary and secondary levels in many parts of the country, and the broader state of public infrastructure including water supply, sanitation, and urban planning in many of India's rapidly growing cities. The argument frequently advanced by critics is that liberalisation's focus on unleashing private sector dynamism was not accompanied by an equally ambitious, sustained effort to build the kind of high-quality public services and social infrastructure that have historically accompanied successful economic development in other countries that have navigated comparable transitions from lower-income to middle-income economic status.
Job creation has emerged as perhaps the single most persistent and politically consequential area of unfinished business highlighted in anniversary retrospectives. Despite India's substantial GDP growth over the past 35 years, the pace of formal, well-paying job creation has, by most economic analyses, consistently lagged what the country's rapidly growing working-age population would require to be fully and productively absorbed into the formal economy. This job creation shortfall has manifested in various ways, including persistently high levels of underemployment and informal, precarious employment, continued heavy reliance on agriculture as an employment sector even as agriculture's contribution to overall GDP has declined substantially, and periodic instances of enormous applicant pools competing for a comparatively small number of formal government or private sector job openings — a pattern that has, at various points, generated significant public and political attention around the adequacy of India's job creation trajectory relative to its demographic and economic growth story.
Infosys co-founder N R Narayana Murthy, among the most closely watched and influential voices in Indian industry, has been particularly vocal in recent commentary about the continued need for further reform, arguing that India can no longer afford to be complacent about protectionist tendencies and that the country's vast MSME sector in particular needs to be freed from what he has characterised as excessive regulatory and inspection burdens if it is to become a more meaningful and dynamic contributor to India's continued economic growth and job creation. This perspective, echoed by numerous other business leaders and economists in various forms, points to a persistent critique that India's liberalisation journey, however transformative in its first several decades, remains genuinely incomplete in important respects, particularly concerning the ease of doing business for smaller enterprises that, in aggregate, represent the largest potential source of the kind of broad-based job creation India's economy continues to need.




